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Aging and the Labor Market 
Joanna Nicole Lahey 
This dissertation is a collection of essays analyzing the 
interplay between aging and the labor market. The first 
chapter demonstrates that differential treatment by age 
exists in labor markets and explores different possible 
explanations. As the baby boom cohort reaches retirement 
age, demographic pressures on public programs such 
as Social Security may cause policymakers to cut 
benefits and encourage work at later ages. This chapter 
reports on a labor market experiment to determine the 
hiring conditions for older women in entry-level jobs in 
Boston, Massachusetts, and st. Petersburg, Florida. I find 
differential interviewing by age for these jobs. A younger 
worker is more than 40 percent more likely to be offered 
an interview than an older worker. I find no evidence 
to support taste-based discrimination as a reason for 
this differential and some evidence to support statistical 
discrimination. 
The second chapter examines more closely one of 
the possible reasons for this differential treatment. Older 
workers may cost employers more in terms of potential 
age discrimination lawsuits. I study the effects of state 
and federal age discrimination laws between 1968 and 
1991. Prior to the enforcement of the federal law, state 
laws had little effect on older workers, suggesting that 
firms either knew little about these laws or did not see 
them as a threat. After the enforcement of the federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 1979, 
white male workers over the age of 50 in states with age 
discrimination laws work fewer weeks per year and are 
less likely to be hired or separated from their jobs, but are 
more likely to be retired (perhaps involuntarily). These 
findings suggest a story in which firms do not wish to hire 
older workers, are afraid to fire older workers, and remove 
older workers through strong incentives to retire in states 
where lawsuits are less of a hurdle for the worker. 
The third chapter, coauthored with Melissa Boyle, 
explores the relationship between health insurance 
coverage and labor market efficiencies termed 'job-lock." 
We exploit an insurance option that is both exogenous to 
work decisions and of lasting duration. A major expansion 
in both the services provided and the popUlation covered 
by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care 
system allows us to both cleanly estimate the extent 
of job-lock, and also to study the impact of publicly 
provided health care on labor supply. Using data from 
the Current Population Survey, we examine the impact 
of health care coverage on labor force participation and 
retirement by comparing veterans and nonveterans before 
and after the VA expansion. Results indicate that workers 
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are significantly more likely to cease working as a result 
of becoming eligible for public insurance, and are also 
more likely to move to part-time work. 
1. Introduction 
In its current state, the Social Security trust fund will 
reach zero in 2041. One commonly suggested solution 
to the Social Security problem is to encourage older 
workers to continue working past retirement (Diamond 
and Orszag 2002). Not only would these workers still be 
paying Social Security taxes, but the normal retirement 
age could then be raised (thus cutting benefits) without 
compromising the living standards ofthese older workers. 
Will Americans be able to find work at older ages? This 
dissertation explores the determinants of work at older 
ages, including age discrimination and health insurance. 
Many older Americans need to work. Bernheim 
(1997) suggests that baby boomers on average are only 
saving a third of what would be needed to maintain a pre-
retirement standard of living after retirement. This lack of 
adequate retirement savings is especially acute for older 
women who have been unexpectedly separated from their 
spouses. On average, widows suffer a 30 percent drop in 
living standards upon the death of a husband (Holden and 
Zick 1998) and the poverty rate for older widows is 15 
percent (Favreault and Sammartino 2002). 
Older Americans are now capable of working at later 
ages than in years past. Studies suggest that today's 70-
year-olds are comparable in health and mental function 
to 65-year-olds from 30 years ago (Schaie 1996). In 
addition to the monetary benefits to working, there are 
also health and psychological benefits to work. Working 
in later ages may contribute to an older person's mental 
acuity and provide a sense of usefulness. Indeed, when 
surveyed, many people say they wish to continue working 
at least part time into later ages as a bridge to retirement 
(Abraham and Houseman 2004). 
Americans will need to work longer, they are capable 
of working longer, and many say they wish to work 
longer. Will they be able to find work at later ages? If 
employers are not willing to hire older workers, then 
cutting Social Security or Medicare benefits may impose a 
greater burden on older Americans than planned. 
1.2 Age Discrimination in the Labor Market 
If an employer makes a decision to hire a younger 
worker over an older worker based on age, that employer 
is practicing age discrimination. Using the most basic 
definition, discrimination is defined as treating people in 
one group differently than people in another group, based 
solely on group characteristics rather than individual 
differences. Thus, preferring workers with college degrees 
is a form of discrimination against high school workers. 
Generally people do not worry when college graduates 
are hired over high school graduates; college-educated 
workers may be higher quality, and, given effort and 
ability, a high school graduate could change his or her 
status. The type of discrimination economists tend to 
worry about most is the kind one thinks of when one 
ordinarily uses the term discrimination-what economists 
term animus or "taste-based" discrimination. Taste-
based discrimination occurs when one group dislikes 
another group for no sufficient reason. This type of 
discrimination does not benefit anyone economically. 
However, another type of discrimination is almost as 
troubling: "statistical" discrimination. When it is costly 
for an employer to determine specific characteristics of an 
individual applicant or worker, sometimes the employer 
will make assumptions about the applicant based on 
group characteristics. Thus, as in the earlier example, a 
college graduate may be assumed to be a more highly 
skilled worker than a high school graduate, regardless of 
actual skill. When statistical discrimination is based on a 
group-status that a high-ability worker can change, such 
as education level, economists generally do not worry 
about it. However, when the group in question is based on 
race, gender, or age, then many high-ability workers may 
be unjustly discriminated against because it is costly for 
employers to test true ability. 
2.1 Existence of Age Discrimination 
There has been very little evidence to show whether 
age discrimination exists in hiring. Abraham and 
Houseman (2004) find that although most older workers 
plan to continue working at least part time instead of fully 
retiring, those who would have to change jobs in order 
to reduce hours are likely to stop working entirely. This 
finding suggests that either workers who would have to 
switch jobs to cut hours are more likely to change their 
minds about working part time or there is something 
preventing them from finding a new job. However, what 
is preventing them mayor may not be discrimination. 
Researchers using the Displaced Workers Survey 
from the Current Population Survey find that older 
workers who have lost their jobs because of layoffs or 
plant closings take longer to find a new job than younger 
workers who have similarly lost their jobs (Diamond and 
Hausman 1984). These findings could be evidence of 
discrimination against older job seekers. However, even 
though older workers have more trouble finding jobs 
than younger workers, that does not mean that firms are 
systematically choosing not to hire an older worker over 
a younger worker. Older workers may be used to getting 
higher wages based on their expertise in a former firm; 
because they know the ins and outs of that specific firm, 
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they are more productive there than they would be in a 
new firm. Economists term this concept "firm-specific 
human capital." Workers with longer job tenure have 
more firm-specific human capital, and thus higher wages 
in the old job. New firms cannot use this firm-specific 
human capital; thus, workers may be less valuable to 
the new firm than to the old firm, and an older worker 
expecting to be paid the same wage will be unable to find 
work at that price. Older workers may also be clustered 
in industries and occupations where demand for workers 
is lower, or have less education on average than younger 
workers. Either of these situations would lead to older 
workers having more difficulty finding jobs than younger, 
even in the absence of discrimination. 
Psychologists have tested for age discrimination 
more directly. In studies where undergraduates or human 
resource managers are given resumes that are identical 
except for age and asked to hypothetically choose 
between them, they will usually choose the younger of 
the two candidates (Nelson 2002). While these studies 
are highly suggestive that age discrimination does exist in 
labor markets, they are not conclusive because they do not 
measure what is actually going on in the hiring process. 
For example, because it is illegal to discriminate based 
on age, even if hiring managers hypothetically prefer 
younger workers, they may hire the older worker at least 
some of the time in practice because they fear potential 
lawsuits. 
In Chapter I of the dissertation, I test age 
discrimination by presenting interview choices to actual 
employers in the labor market and measuring their 
genuine responses. I sent out resumes for job applicants 
with different ages and measured the response rate of 
employers asking for interviews. This type of study is 
called an "audit study" and has been useful in the past for 
determining race and gender discrimination in labor and 
housing markets. In these studies, researchers sent out 
two trained "auditors," matched in all respects except the 
variable of interest, usually race, to rent an apartment, buy 
a house or interview for ajob (e.g., Fix and Struyk 1992; 
Neumark, Bank, and VanNort 1996; Yinger 1998). 
There are some limits to the audit technology. Because 
it is difficult to find an older person who is identical to a 
younger person except for age, I could not actually send 
people to interview for jobs. Thus I only have information 
about the first part of the hiring screening process-from 
resume to interview. However, studies on gender and 
race find additional discrimination once the candidates 
have reached the interview stage, so it is likely that older 
applicants being interviewed will not be preferred over 
younger applicants. 
I sent 3,996 resumes to firms in the Boston, 
Massachusetts, and SI. Petersburg, Florida, metropolitan 
areas. These resumes were for job applicants between the 
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ages of35 and 62. Because most people do not actually 
put their ages on resumes but do put the date of their 
education degrees, I indicate age by date of high school 
graduation. Job listings were found via the local Sunday 
want-ads and through cold-calling firms listed in local 
phone books. 
Because I was worried that employers might infer 
things I could not measure about the resumes differently 
for older workers than for younger workers, I had to limit 
the types of resumes I looked at. It is difficult to know 
what employers value in a work history for different 
jobs; therefore I only applied to entry-level jobs, or jobs 
that required up to a year of education and experience 
combined. These included positions such as clerical work, 
licensed practical nurse, air conditioner repair person, or 
nail technician, among others. Applicauts also have short 
work histories in very entry-level fields such as data entry 
or fast food. 
I also limit my sample to female job applicants. When 
an adult mau applies for an entry-level job, especially 
with only a short work history, the employer is likely to 
think that there is something wrong with that mau. In the 
worst case scenario, the employer might think the man 
had been incarcerated, and the older man incarcerated for 
longer than the younger with the same resume. However, 
employers generally assume that a female applicant has 
been at home taking care of her family, regardless of age. 
Since the majority of the jobs applied for in this study 
are in female-dominated industries, my experiment gives 
a very accurate picture of the job opportunities for one 
of the most at-risk populations of older workers-recent 
widows and divorcees needing to find work. This 
popUlation is highly likely to be affected by policy 
changes. 
Figure I shows the downward trend of the probability 
of being called in for an interview by age in the two cities. 
I find that a younger worker is more than 40 percent 
more likely to be called back for au interview than an 
older worker, where older is defined as age 50 or older. In 
Massachusetts, this trend translates into a younger seeker 
having to send in 19 resumes for one interview request 
and an older seeker having to send in 27. Similarly, in 
Florida these numbers are 16.4 aud 23, respectively. 
Of course, these numbers are only averages and 
include people applying for different types of jobs, 
as well as resumes that have different educational 
requirements, such as nursing certificates for those 
applying for Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) positions 
or a cosmetology license for hair stylist applicants. Thus, 
different parts ofthe population may end up having to 
send a different number of applications before finding 
employment. For example, a younger worker qualified as 
a licensed practical nurse (LPN) in Florida would have 
to respond to 5.5 ads before receiving an interview offer, 
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whereas au older worker would have to respond to 10. 
However, a younger worker looking for clerical work in 
Massachusetts would have to send 32 job applications and 
au older worker would have to send 72. 
Why can't an older worker send in more resumes than 
a younger to get the same number of interview requests? 
In order for an older worker to be able to do that, there 
would have to be an infinite (or at least very large) 
number of job openings available each week. However, 
for most fields, there are not. Although a paper for a 
metropolitau area such as St. Petersburg-Tampa Bay may 
have two or three dozen ads looking for LPNs or dental 
assistants, there are many fewer jobs advertised for other 
positions. There are generally fewer than lOads each 
week for preschool teacher or hair dresser. Some positions 
are rarely advertised at all, such as gem appraiser (an 
occupation that requires 6 months to a year of training). 
Additionally, mauy of the ads run for more than one week 
at a time, thus making many ads in a week repeats from 
the previous week. 
Using a back of the envelope calculation, I estimate 
how long it takes au older worker to find a job compared 
to a younger worker, assuming she applies to all 
applicable ads in the paper every week. Ifwe assume 
that it takes 7-10 interviews to obtain a position (which 
may be optimistic, since that is the estimate for college 
graduates), then a younger LPN will receive ajob offer in 
a week, and an older LPN will have to wait 3 weeks for 
a job offer. At the other extreme, a younger worker will 
take 6-10 weeks to receive a clerical job offer (assuming 
that half of the ads each week are repeats each week), 
and an older worker will not receive a job offer for 14-20 
weeks. This figure could be even larger, since within a 
five-month period there are even more repeat ads; places 
that advertised and rejected the older worker in month one 
will advertise again in month five. 
Figure 1 Probability of an Interview by Age 
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Thus there are real welfare effects of this age 
discrimination for older workers, especially for those 
who most need work: those with low savings. Cutting 
federal benefits could have real effects for these workers 
because they may have more trouble finding work 
than younger workers. It is important to know why 
younger workers are preferred to older in order to make 
appropriate policy recommendations concerning the 
needs and desires of older job seekers. For example, if 
the problem is an irrational dislike of older people (taste-
based discrimination), educating employers or more 
strictly enforcing discrimination laws in hiring may be 
appropriate. However, if older workers in general lack a 
certain skills set, then additional training programs for 
these workers targeted at those skills may be of help. If 
older workers are more costly because they cost more 
for the company in terms of health insurance, then 
the government may want to subsidize these costs or 
encourage methods of health insurance that shift cost from 
the firm to the worker, such as private health accounts. 
2.2 Reasons for Age Discrimination 
I am also able to test some of these possible reasons 
in Chapter 1. Table I shows a list oftop 10 reasons from 
a survey of employers that asked employers why other 
employers might be reluctant to hire older workers. Some 
ofthese reasons do not apply to the entry-level set-up for 
which I found discrimination. For example, since these 
are entry-level jobs, the length of the career path is short, 
thus career potential (the most listed reason) shouldn't 
matter. Salary expectations (reason 5) may also be less of 
an issue, since these jobs often have set salary schedules. 
Additionally, the resumes list current work experience, 
so there should not be worries about the reason why the 
applicant left the previous job (reason 9) as the applicant 
is currently employed. Because there is discrimination 
even in the absence of these possible reasons, there must 
be other explanations for the differential treatment. 
Some of the reasons listed could be explored using the 
experimental framework described above. For example, 
if employers think that older workers are more likely to 
lack computer skills than are younger workers (a version 
of reason 7, knowledge and skills obsolescence), then 
if an older worker can indicate that she has these skills 
employers will be less likely to discriminate against her. 
Thus, information about computer skills should help the 
older seeker more than the younger if it is indicated for 
both, because the employer already assumed that the 
younger seeker had these skills. Similarly, an attendance 
award on a previous job should alleviate worries that an 
older worker will have more absences than a similarly 
qualified younger worker (reason 6). Using this technique, 
I find that employers may fear a lack of computer skills, 
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Table 1 Reasons for Differential Hiring 
1. Short career potential (specific HC investment) 
2. Lack energy 
3. Costs of health and life insurance and pensions 
4. Less flexible/adaptable 
5. Higher salary expectations 
6. Health risks ~> absences 
7. Knowledge and skills obsolescence 
8. Block career paths of younger workers 
9. Suspicion about competence (why leave job?) 
10. Fear of discrimination suit 
SOURCE: List taken from Rhine (1984). 
but only in the Massachusetts sample. I find no evidence 
that employers are worried about absences. 
I tried to test for a few of the other reasons on the 
list as well, with less success. To see if reason 2, lack 
of energy, is a reason employers prefer not to hire older 
workers, I put on some resumes that the applicant plays a 
sport. I find that this item harms both older and younger 
workers, so it is probably not signaling energy, but rather 
the likelihood of getting an injury while playing sports 
over the weekend. Similarly, putting down "I am flexible" 
or "I am willing to embrace change," as the AARP 
suggests to signal flexibility and adaptability (reason 
4), actually hurts older workers. Instead of showing 
flexibility and adaptability, such statements may just be 
showing that the applicant is a member of the AARP. The 
remaining reasons for differential treatment could not be 
tested under this scenario. 
A possible reason for differential treatment of older 
workers, one not mentioned in the Rhine survey, is taste-
based discrimination, an irrational dislike of older people 
in the workplace. Employers may dislike older workers 
("employer taste-based discrimination"), employees may 
not like working with older workers ("employee taste-
based discrimination"), or people could dislike buying 
products that older workers are selling ("consumer 
taste-based discrimination"). I test these possibilities in 
my experimental framework by making an assumption 
that younger people dislike being around older people 
more than older people do. Using this assumption, I can 
match the age distribution of an area with the interview 
rates in my sample by zip code. I find that neither the age 
distribution of employees nor of customers in a zip code 
has any effect on the interview rates in an area. Thus I 
find no evidence for this kind of irrational discrimination. 
However, there are two problems with this method. First, 
I only have age distribution information by zip code 
rather than by firm; thus I cannot exactly match up the age 
composition of the firms doing the hiring, so my results 
are biased toward finding no result, because I might not 
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be measuring what I am hoping to measure. Secondly. the 
assumption about age preferences may not be true: older 
and younger people may have no difference in preferences 
for whom they associate with. or older people may prefer 
being with younger people to a much greater extent than 
younger people do. 
To test employer taste-based discrimination. I compare 
firms with human resources departments to those 
without human resources departments. Human resource 
professionals may have less taste-based discrimination 
because of training and knowledge of discrimination 
laws. Iffirms with human resources departments are 
more likely to interview older workers than firms without 
human resources departments, that would support taste-
based discrimination, since places with HR departments 
know it is illegal to discriminate and that discrimination 
has consequences. However, firms with HR departments 
may be more likely to practice statistical discrimination 
because they have more knowledge of the productivity 
and costs of older workers and applicants compared 
to younger. I find that firms with human resources 
departments may be more likely to interview younger 
workers, which would support the case of statistical rather 
than taste-based discrimination, but this finding is not 
significant. Thus, now that age discrimination in hiring 
has been shown to exist, there is still room for research as 
to the determinants of age discrimination. 
3. The Effects of Age Discrimination Laws 
Age discrimination laws are another reason that older 
workers may be more costly to employ than younger. 
Chapter 2 ofthe dissertation explores the effect of 
age discrimination laws on labor market outcomes for 
older workers. Employers may be afraid to hire older 
workers because older workers can sue them under the 
age discrimination act if they are later fired or fail to be 
promoted. It is much easier for an employer to avoid 
these kinds of lawsuits by simply failing to hire an older 
worker, since the older worker generally cannot prove that 
he or she has been discriminated against during the hiring 
stage, but the worker has more evidence about why he or 
she was fired or not promoted (Gustman and Steinmeier 
1994). I compare labor market outcomes of older people 
in states where it is easier to sue under age discrimination 
laws to older people in states where it is not as easy to sue. 
Age discrimination laws prohibit differential treatment 
in the labor market based on age. The first state age 
discrimination law was instituted in 1903 in Colorado, 
and by 1960, eight states had age discrimination laws. 
Federal legislation protecting older workers overall did 
not appear until 1967, with the introduction of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, (ADEA). The 1967 
ADEA prohibited age based discrimination for those 
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aged 40--65 in firms with 20 or more workers. Under 
this act, employers were barred from using age in hiring, 
laying off, firing, compensation, or other conditions of 
employment. It also prohibited employers from using 
age-specific language in advertising. In 1978, congress 
extended the protected age group to 40-70 and eliminated 
mandatory retirement for most federal employees. A 
second major change, in terms of enforcement, came in 
1979 when the Department of Labor (and, for federal 
employment, the U.S. Civil Service Commission) 
gave administrative responsibility to the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Most 
researchers agree that this change strengthened the power 
of the ADEA since the change came with an increase 
in resources and an increase in "pattern and practice" 
lawsuits (Neumark 2001). 
State age discrimination laws are important because 
with a large backlog of cases, the EEOC rarely prosecutes 
claims itself. If a state has statutes, the claimant must file 
with the state Fair Employment Practices (FEP) office 
within 300 days, otherwise the claimant must first file 
with the EEOC within 180 days. After the enforcement 
of the ADEA, white older men in states where it is easier 
to sue are less likely to be hired than such men in states 
where it is more difficult. They are also less likely to be 
fired and more likely to say they are retired. Overall, older 
white men work fewer weeks per year in states where it is 
easier to sue than in states where it is not as easy to sue. 
These findings suggest that firms do not wish to hire older 
men, are afraid to fire older men, and remove older men 
through strong incentives to retire in states where lawsuits 
are less of a hurdle for the men. 
However, fear of lawsuits under age discrimination 
laws cannot tell the entire story. There is no effect of ease 
of lawsuit on the hiring possibilities for women. This 
fact could be because older women are the least litigious 
group in the United States-in general, older women just 
do not sue. Thus employers do not see potential lawsuits 
as a possible cost to hiring an older woman, just to hiring 
an older man. Future research needs to be done to explore 
other possible reasons for age discrimination, such as 
health care costs. 
4. Health Insnrance, Job-Lock, and 
Veterans Affairs 
Chapter 3 of the dissertation explores one possible 
link between health insurance and employment of older 
workers, but not in the context of age discrimination. This 
chapter, coauthored with Melissa Boyle, explores the 
relationship between health insurance coverage and labor 
market efficiencies termed "job-lock." Job-lock occurs 
when health insurance provision is tied to labor market 
status. If workers alter their labor supply and retirement 
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decisions because of fears over losing health insurance 
coverage, this mobility impediment is termed 'job-lock." 
The current literature on job-lock has established a 
link between health insurance and labor market decisions. 
However, this literature has not fully considered whether 
the introduction of government-sponsored health care, 
such as Medicare or Medicaid, may alleviate job-lock. 
Ifworkers have an alternative source of health care 
rather than depending solely on employer-provided 
insurance, their job mobility may increase. This study can 
measure possible labor market effects of expanding these 
programs. 
We exploit an insurance option that is exogenous to 
work decisions, and of lasting duration~the expansion of 
the Veterans Affairs health Care system. The Department 
of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system is a network 
of hospitals, established over 70 years ago for the purpose 
of providing specialty care to low-income veterans and 
veterans with conditions resulting from their military 
service. In the mid 1990s, the VA expanded in two 
different ways. First, VA health care began a shift from an 
emphasis on hospital-based specialty services to a focus 
on primary care and preventive medicine, dramatically 
increasing the number of outpatient visits. Second, the 
VA expanded the population they administered to from 
low-income and disabled veterans to allow all veterans to 
become eligible for care. 
This expansion in both the services provided and the 
population covered by the Department of Veterans Affairs 
health care system allows us to both cleanly estimate the 
extent of job-lock, and also to study the impact of publicly 
provided health care on labor supply. We use data from 
the Current Population Survey to examine the impact 
of health care coverage on labor force participation and 
retirement using a differences-in-differences estimator by 
comparing veterans and nonveterans before and after the 
VA expansion. 
We find that workers are significantly likely to cease 
working as a result of becoming eligible for public 
insurance. As a result of gaining VA coverage, the 
probability of working drops by 0.34 percentage points 
for a prime-aged worker with average characteristics and 
by 2.43 percentage points for the average older worker. 
The introduction of the VA health care benefit increases 
the probability of entering retirement for older workers 
by 0.38 percentage points. For prime-aged workers, the 
probability that the average veteran is self-employed 
increases by 0.14 percentage points, but the average 
veteran between the ages of 55 and 64 is less likely to 
become self-employed. 
In addition to studying the impact of public insurance 
availability on the probability of self-employment, we 
also examine the effects of insurance on part-time work. 
Because most part-time jobs do not provide workers with 
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benefits such as health insurance, workers who place a 
high value on these benefits may avoid moving into part-
time work in order to maintain their health insurance 
coverage. In surveys, older workers often state that they 
would prefer to transition into retirement by moving 
first to part-time employment (Abraham and Houseman 
2004). If moving to part-time work means losing health 
insurance, however, older workers may be reluctant to 
do so. We find that the average veteran is more likely to 
work part time than remain full time as a result of gaining 
outside health insurance coverage. For older workers, we 
estimate a 1.2 percentage point increase in the probability 
of working part-time. Prime-aged workers have a 0.4 
percentage point increase in the probability of working 
part time. 
Our results demonstrate a significant effect of public 
health insurance on work decisions. We find particularly 
strong results for those workers in the 55-M-year-old 
age group, who are approaching the normal retirement 
age. For this age group, our results suggest a positive 
and significant increase in early retirement with the 
availability of outside health care coverage. Overall, 
our study confrrrns the job-lock effects of tying health 
insurance to employment, and suggests that public health 
insurance expansions have the potential to alleviate some 
of the reductions injob mobility caused by this type of 
health insurance regime. 
5. Conclnding Comments 
This dissertation explores important employment issues 
facing older job applicants. First, it clearly demonstrates 
the existence of age discrimination and explores some of 
the possible reasons for this differential treatment. Second, 
it finds that age discrimination laws hurt the labor market 
opportunities for white older men. Finally, it shows that 
expanding public health care programs for older workers 
would increase retirement and part-time work for older 
workers, and would increase job mobility and self-
employment for prime-aged workers as well. 
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